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"Diversification" is a word of many meanings. Investors com-
monly speak of limiting their risks through "diversification," that is,
by distributing their investment among different securities. To many
businessmen "diversification" is a coming of age, a sign that a com-
pany has reached a stage of size and opulence that justifies new
products, new plants, research staffs, and national advertising. This
type of diversification may rest on economies of scale or it may also
be an attempt to limit risk by spreading commitments. The Federal
Communications Commission refers to its policy of diffusing the
ownership of broadcast licenses among a number of owners as "diversi-
fication." And members of the antitrust fraternity employ diversifica-
tion, usually in connection with discussions of "conglomerate" as dis-
tinct from horizontal and vertical mergers, as a descriptive word
referring to the production of different products (usually in separate
industries) by the same firm." In view of such varied usage, it is not
surprising that "diversification" has the same root as the word "diver-
sion," which Webster defines as "the act of turning a person aside
from his course"; "that which relaxes and amuses; a sport or pastime."
Semantics aside, the inquiry to which this paper is directed is a
plain one: the wisdom of regulatory policies which prohibit or control
the opportunities of a regulated firm to engage in a business other
than the one subject to specific economic regulation. 2 Policies of this
type are fairly common in the regulated industries and no attempt
will be made to be all-inclusive. After an introductory analysis, I
will discuss three illustrative instances: (1) rail ownership of motor
carriers; (2) newspaper ownership of broadcasting stations; and
(3) combined ownership of local electric and gas utilities.
1 G. E. Hale and R. D. Hale, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT (1958) c.6, contains an able discussion of product diversification
as an antitrust problem.
2 In this paper the word "diversification" will be avoided because of its
other usages, and the more descriptive terms "common ownership" or "com-
bined ownershil" will be used interchangeably to denote regulatory policies
which prohibit or control the opportunities of a regulated firm to engage in a
business other than the one subject to specific economic regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
Assume that a railroad subject to economic regulation by the ICC
desires to engage in unrestricted motor carrier operations in interstate
commerce. Entry into the motor carrier field is restricted by law and
there seems little reason why a rail owner should not be required
to meet the usual tests applied to new entrants generally. That is not
the issue. The issue is whether special restrictions, not applicable to
other entrants, should be placed on a railroad merely because it is a
railroad.
Why should the public or the regulatory agency be concerned one
way or the other whether a motor carrier applicant is a railroad, a
retired plumber, or a veterinarian? Or whether a broadcasting appli-
cant is a newspaper, an insurance company, or a department store?
The answer may be discovered only by reference to the effects of
allowing or prohibiting combined ownership and the purposes of the
regulatory statutes which are involved.
The effects of common ownership may be viewed in largely eco-
nomic terms. If substantial economies of joint operation exist, it
may be desirable to obtain them. Even if not, public policy does not
generally support limitations on investment opportunities. On the
other hand, if common ownership will or may lead to a decline of inter-
industry competition, to an enhanced concentration of economic power
in either of the industries involved, or to restrictive practices of one
kind or another, common ownership may be undesirable. In short, if
the goal of regulatory policy is to approximate the results which
would be reached if competition were possible in the regulated indus-
try, a weighing of the costs and benefits of a policy prohibiting or
allowing common ownership provides a manageable assessment of that
policy. Even though it may be difficult in any particular situation to
predict the effects of a given policy, the task of measuring the effects
against the competitive ideal is a familiar one to both economists and
antitrust lawyers.
The peculiar difficulty confronting the regulatory agency (and its
critic) is that it cannot approach common ownership with the rela-
tively single focus of the antitrust laws: the promotion and preserva-
tion of economic competition. The regulatory statutes usually speak
in terms of "the public interest" and those elusive and vagrant words
may or may not include antitrust objectives within their purview.
Indeed, a desire to limit or displace competition frequently provides
the primary motivation for regulation. Even if the public-interest
standard incorporates antitrust objectives, the promotion of selected
types of competition is usually only one of a number of somewhat
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inconsistent objectives, each one of which is to be given an unassigned
weight in reaching a decision. The phenomenon of weightlessness is
not a unique experience of the space explorer! Moreover, matters of
administrative convenience may bulk large. "Workable regulation"
is as much a fact of life as "workable competition." If the ownership
of unregulated businesses by regulated firms complicates the regula-
tory task, this in itself may prove a valid ground of objection.
Controversies concerning common ownership usually rest on
unsupported assertions that unfortunate results will follow from the
policy under attack. The implicit assumptions concerning regulatory
objectives ordinarily remain unstated. A brief discussion of the major
alternative effects of prohibiting or allowing common ownership will
illustrate the interplay of regulatory objectives and economic effects.
First, common ownership may reduce competition within the
regulated industry by leading to outside domination, monopoly con-
ditions, or restraints of trade. For example, it is alleged that unre-
stricted rail entry into the motor carrier field would result in rail
domination of motor transportation or in reduced motor carrier
competition. This argument assumes that a degree of competition in
the regulated industry is desirable, as well as that the existing
competitive situation will be adversely affected by the entry of firms
with other interests. Per contra, entry of an additional firm may
intensify competition in the regulated industry, and artificial restraints
on investment may reduce the supply of capital available for investment
in the industry.
Second, common ownership may reduce inter-industry competition,
such as between railroads and motor carriers. This argument assumes
that the two industries are competitive with one another to some
degree, and that inter-industry competition is desirable under the
regulatory scheme. Per contra, by intensifying competition in one
or both industries, inter-industry competition may be increased.
Third, common ownership may result in excessive competition
which undermines the regulatory scheme. Unfair practices, cutthroat
competition and excess capacity are the slogans at this point. This
argument reverses the positions taken in the prior headings, since
common ownership is here alleged to increase rather than decrease
competition, which is now viewed as undesirable rather than desirable.
Fourth, common ownership may result in an uneconomic misallo-
cation of resources, either because of excessive investment or because
of undesirable promotion of one enterprise at the expense of a regulated
enterprise. Thus an electric utility, promoting the sale of electricity
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by below-cost sales of electrical appliances, may attract business away
from competing lower-cost fuels (as well as harming independent
appliance dealers). Per contra, any restriction on combined owner-
ship may deprive society of substantial economies of combined opera-
tion resulting in a different form of misallocation of resources.
Fifth, common ownership may lead to the demise of small and
independent firms and their replacement by large, integrated and
wealthy enterprises. The social desirability of small firms is here
countered by the arguments that a preference for small business may
be achieved only at the expense of efficiency and that in general it is
desirable to preserve free and equal access to competitive opportuni-
ties, whether the enterprises be large or small.
Sixth, common ownership may be opposed on other social grounds
implied from the regulatory scheme, such as the desirability in broad-
casting regulation Of promoting as wide a variety and diversity of
viewpoints as possible in the media of mass communications. Per
contra, it is argued that the additional revenues of a monopoly position
are necessary to assure adequate programming; or that it is only
fair that a regulated firm in a declining industry (a railroad) be
allowed to continue by entering a growing competitive industry
(trucking).
Finally, common ownership may aggravate the already difficult
task of economic regulation. Whenever a regulated firm has activities
in other fields, particularly if those activities are unregulated, costs
must be apportioned, transactions scrutinized, etc. This argument
rests on administrative convenience, not on the merits, but it may
be an important consideration nonetheless.
This potpourri of representative arguments, policies and cliches
reproduces in microcosm the ambivalent attitudes and assumptions'
concerning free competition current in our society. In brief compass
it will not be possible to consider each in detail, but I will discuss
several in the context of the regulatory policies applied in three dif-
ferent industries: motor transportation, broadcasting, and local utili-
ties.3
3 A word of caution is in order. Any discussion of common ownership is
greatly hampered by the lack of empirical data concerning the effects of par-
ticular regulatory policies (e.g., whether or not a policy of preventing combined
ownership in a given situation denies the public the benefit of economies of joint
operation) and by the ambiguity of regulatory objectives. In the absence of
definitive information or crystallized policy, one must do the best one can with
what is available. I have attempted to warn the reader by making my assump-
tions as explicit as possible.
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II. SUMMARY OF PRESENT LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Rail Ownership of Motor Carriers. Three provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act are relevant to rail ownership of motor
carriers and each of these provisions is not without interpretative
difficulties.4 Fortunately it is unnecessary to treat in detail the statu-
tory language, the administrative interpretation, and the judicial
decisions. Twenty-five years of application have resulted in a fairly
clear-cut rule: a railroad may own and operate motor carriers, if
otherwise in the public interest, only if such operation is auxiliary
and supplementary to rail service.5
In practice, the requirement that motor carrier service be aux-
iliary and supplementary to train operations means that the motor
service is performed on rail ladings at rail rates; that service is con-
fined to points which are stations on the railroad; that longhaul motor
transportation along the rail line, even in substitution of rail opera-
tions, is not permitted; and that the ICC retains power to impose
further restrictions if subsequent developments so require. These
are the special restrictions to which railroads so vociferously object.
B. Newspaper Ownership of Radio and Television Stations.
From time to time the Federal Communications Commission has
stressed the social and economic importance of limiting concentration
4 The National Transportation Policy, 49 U. S. C., note preceding §1, lays
a broad duty upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to administer the Act
so as "to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each mode of
transportation." Section 5(2) (b) of the Act (formerly section 213(a) (1) of
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 555) authorizes consolidation, merger,
acquisition or lease of carriers if found by the ICC to be "consistent with the
public interest." However, in transactions involving a motor carrier where
a railroad or its affiliate is an applicant, Congress directed the ICC "not to
enter such an order unless it finds that the transaction proposed" not only is in
the public interest but "will enable such rail carrier to use service by motor
vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly restrain com-
petition." The ICC, with judicial approval, has interpreted this language to
confine acquisition of a motor carrier by a railroad to "operations .. .which
are auxiliary or supplementary to train service." The third provision, section
207(a) of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U. S. C. 307(a), authorizing the issuance
of new motor carrier operating rights if the ICC finds, that the proposed service
is required by public interest, convenience and necessity, adds a further com-
plexity because it does not contain any special limitations on railroad applica-
tions. The ICC, however, again with judicial approval, has carried over its
concept of "auxiliary and supplementary service" to applications for new service
filed under 207(a), with the special practice of allowing the issuance of unre-
stricted motor carrier rights to railroads if "special circumstances" are found
to exist which make such a grant in the public interest.
5 For a careful description and analysis of the statutory provisions, adminis-
trative decisions, and judicial decisions relating to motor carrier operations by
railroads, see Fulda, RAIL-MOTOR COMPETITION: MOTOR-CARRIER OPERATIONS BY
RAILROADS, 54 Nw. U. L. Rev. 156 (1959), a revised version of which will
shortly appear as a chapter in a text on Competition in the Regulated Industries.
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of control of the media of mass communications. Its so-called "diver-
ification" policy, which awards a preference in a comparative hearing
to applicants not connected with other communications media, pur-
ports to implement this objective." Nevertheless, newspapers and
other communications media have encountered few difficulties in
entering the broadcasting business. The statistics speak for them-
selves: in 1959 a total of 755 radio and television stations were news-
paper affiliated, constituting 14.3% of all radio (AM and FM) sta-
tions and 34.7% of all TV stations on the air.7 The explanation is
easily found: the FCC's "diversification" policy is applied only in com-
parative hearings (where more than one person applies for the same
broadcasting facility), and even there is likely to be outweighed by
other factors, such as local ownership or broadcast experience. Fur-
thermore, the quantitative unimportance of the comparative hearing
in the grant of radio and television licenses renders the policy almost
completely ineffective. The vast majority of broadcast licenses are
not operated at any given moment of time by a licensee who obtained
his license in a comparative hearing. A much larger proportion of
licensees obtain their licenses either through uncontested grants or
as a result of purchase on the open market. For example, of 139 TV
stations in which newspapers held a majority stock interest in early
1958, 72 had been obtained by the newspaper owners as sole applicants
in uncontested grants; another 57 of the 139 stations had been pur-
chased from other broadcasters; only 10 had been obtained through
a comparative hearing in which the diversification policy would be
treated as an adverse factor against the newspaper applicant.8
C. Combined Ownership of Gas and Electric Utilities. After
some equivocation, the Securities and Exchange Commission in its
administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
took the position that an integrated public utility system should not
include both gas and electric companies, unless one of the services was
incidental to the other or unless substantial economies resulted from
joint operation. 9 The SEC, however, was concerned only with hold-
6 For a full discussion and critique of the FCC's so-called "diversification"
policy, see Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest: Administrative
Responsibility of the FCC, 66 Yale L. J. 365 (1957), which cites the leading
decisions and commentary thereon.
7 Data concerning newspaper affiliation is found in the Broadcasting Yearbook
published by Broadcasting Magazine.
8 Levin, BROADCASTING REGULATION AND INTER-MEDIUM COMPETITION, 45
Va. L. Rev. 1104, 1120 (1959).
9 See Ritchie, THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES
(1955) c. 4.
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ing company systems; the responsibility of regulating operating com-
panies was left to the states, which have been free to formulate their
own policies regarding combined ownership.
The prevalence of common ownership of gas and electric utilities,
which are found in almost all states, indicates that state public utility
commissions have allowed if not encouraged combination. An incom-
plete search of state statutes and regulations indicates that in many
states commission approval is required; that in other states the matter
seems to be left to the discretion of utility management; and that in
one state, Massachusetts, a statutory provision prohibits combined
operation unless the commission finds that it will promote the public
interest. Whatever the provision may be, it is apparent that a strong
regulatory policy against combined ownership does not exist.
Thus in three regulated industries quite different policies are
applied in situations of common ownership: severe restrictions are
imposed upon railroads desiring to perform interstate motor carrier
operations; a policy adverse to newspaper ownership of broadcasting
facilties exists, but is ineffectively implemented; and there does not
appear to be any consensus that common ownership of electric and
gas utilities is unwise. Can these differences be justified? If not,
which position is more nearly in accordance with the public interest
which the regulatory schemes purportedly exist to serve?
III. AN EVALUATION OF REGULATORY POLICIES
A. Rail Ownership of Motor Carriers: Strangulation vs. Coordi-
nation. In the battle of words between railroads and motor carriers
regarding the desirability of the present restrictions on rail ownership
of motor carriers, two opposing theories are predominant. The
truckers rely on the "strangulation" theory, arguing that rail entry
will result in rail domination of motor trucking and a decline of rail-
motor competition. The railroads, while disputing this theory, rest
their affirmative case on the improved service and operating economies
that rail-motor "coordination" allegedly would produce. An evalua-
tion of present regulatory policy must examine the merits of these
competing arguments.
1. The strangulation argument. The strangulation argument runs
as follows: Railroads tend to be substantial companies with a large
fixed investment in railroad plant and convenient access to large sup-
plies of capital. If railroads are permitted to enter the motor carrier
field, they will operate their motor carrier affiliates in order to protect
their investment in railroad property. They will engage in predatory
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price-cutting with the intent to drive their smaller, less well-financed
motor carrier competitors out of business. Once they are successful,
rates will be raised to monopoly levels. The result will be rail domina-
tion of motor trucking and an end to competition between the two
modes of transportation.
The truckers do not concede that joint rail-motor operations would
produce substantial economies; and they certainly do not take the
position that railroads would be able to operate motor trucks more
economically than they can. Motor transportation is a highly compet-
itive field at present. The argument that rail entry under these
circumstances will result in monopoly conditions rests on a series of
assumptions which require examination.
The statement that the railroads would resort to predatory price-
cutting in order to drive independent motor carriers out of business
assumes that it would be profitable for them to do so and that capital
on the scale required would be available to them to carry out the job.
Both assumptions are questionable. If a profitable, domination of
motor trucking could be achieved by predatory price-cutting, it is
not apparent why firms other than railroads would not be interested
in making the attempt. And considering the present state of railroad
finances, it seems likely that capital to carry on a war of attrition would
be as readily available to the truckers as it would be to the railroads.
Moreover, entry into the trucking industry does not require large
sums of capital, and it is doubtful if a railroad could prevent truckers
from re-entering even if price-cutting was successful in isolated situ-
ations. In summary, if this argument is valid as applied to the motor
carrier industry, it would appear to be valid in competitive industries
generally; and experience refutes such a view. 10
The discussion thus far has ignored the existence of the regulatory
scheme. When the strangulation theory is viewed in the context of
the regulatory scheme, its weakness is even more apparent. Consider
these points: (1) Even if the special restrictions on rail entry were
removed, the ICC would be required to find that a rail acquisition of
10 The argument here is related to the "recoupment" theory discussed by
antitrust writers. See Bork, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT:
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF AN ECONOMIC MISCONCEPTION, '22 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
157, 194-201 (1954); Bowman, TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE LEVERAGE
PROBLEM, 67 Yale L. J. 19 (1957).
There is the special problem of -the railroad substituting unprofitable motor
carrier operations for even more unprofitable rail operations. This may occur
because the railroad is unwilling or unable to abandon unprofitable operations,
yet desires to minimize its losses. The fact that motor carrier operations are
unprofitable will usually mean that the service is not one which competing
motor carriers would want to provide, the most typical instance being small
shipment and passenger service in rural communities.
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a motor carrier was "in the public interest." (2) Any rail application
for new operating rights would be subject to the ICC's policy of
keeping competition within bounds and protecting existing firms from
additional competition. (3) Predatory rates, presumably those not
covering out-of-pocket costs, would be subject to ICC suspension and
disapproval, and under present law would not be allowed. (4) Anti-
trust policies do have a limited relevance in motor carrier acquisition
and certification cases." It is doubtful that applications which would
be likely to lead to monopoly would be approved.
The available empirical evidence, I believe, supports my doubts.
It is said that the railroads once employed "fighting ships" on the
Great Lakes and that they presently engage in lobbying activities
designed to further railroad interests. One would hardly expect rail-
roads to lobby in favor of new highways! The truth is that some
railroads obtained unrestricted grandfather rights from the ICC and
many others engaged in extensive intrastate motor carrier operations.
In recent years about 2yo of all motor carrier revenues have been
earned by railroad affiliates. There does not appear to be any evidence
of predatory price-cutting, or of rail domination of motor transporta-
tion in those areas in which railroads are presently engaged in exten-
sive motor carrier operations. The motor carrier affiliates of railroads
are operated as profit-making enterprises which are expected to make
a return on the railroad's investment of capital in them.
2. The coordination argument. Self-serving arguments, however,
are not confined to the truckers. The railroad argument seems almost
as dubious. The railroads argue that integrated transportation com-
panies would provide much better and much cheaper service because
the most economic and desirable form of transportation would be
utilized for each part of the transportation job. The economies of
joint operation would more than offset any reduction in inter-industry
competition. The argument for coordinated or integrated transporta-
tion assumes that situations of the following type are frequent: A
shipper desires to ship goods from A to C. Shipment can be performed
at lowest cost and with best service, or the most desirable combination
of the two, if rail transport is utilized from A to B, an intermediate
point between A and C, and motor transport from B to C. The rail-
roads argue that the separate economies of operation of each mode
on each of the two route segments outweigh the costs of transshipment
from one mode to the other at B, and that the desire of each mode
to handle the traffic for the entire distance prevents cooperative or
other arrangements by which each would perform the transportation
11 See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67 (1944).
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functions for which it is best fitted. Each assertion is questionable.
The cost and delay of transshipment may be greater than anticipated;
and the unwillingness of railroads and truckers to engage in mutually
profitable cooperation appears to be exaggerated. Moreover, if the
rates on the separate route segments reflect cost differentials, as is
increasingly likely under the pressure of rail-motor competition,
shippers and freight forwarders will become aware of them and make
their own arrangements to obtain their benefit. On the other hand,
if the lower costs exist on a segment in which there is little com-
petition, such as a rail line having some natural monopoly charac-
teristics, it seems unlikely that the railroad will pass on its monopoly
earnings to the shipper merely because the remainder of the haul is
performed by a motor carrier affiliate of the railroad. Finally, there is
no evidence that railroads can perform assembly and distribution
functions any more cheaply than truckers or freight forwarders.
This discussion of rail entry into motor transportation has assumed
that rail-motor carrier competition is desirable, in that it encourages
or forces each mode of transportation to concentrate on the type of
service that it can best perform, thus producing an optimum division
of labor and allocation of resources. It should be emphasized that
transportation policy is not unambiguous on the point. The promo-
tional development of aviation, highways and internal waterways
modifies the terms of intermodal competition; and the protective
policies insulating existing carriers against new competition are in
direct conflict with it. Thus an examination of regulatory policy
toward rail entry which overlooks the complexity and ambiguity of
public policy toward competition in transportation would be mis-
leading.
B. Newspaper Ownership of Radio and Television Stations. In
the field of broadcasting the general acceptance of competition as a
desirable social policy simplifies the problem. Broadcasting is not
subject to rate regulation in the United States, and existing stations
do not have a right to be protected from new competition. The regu-
lation is designed to ration a scarce commodity (the radio spectrum)
and to insure certain minimum standards of service. Antitrust policies
have correspondingly greater application and relevance; and regula-
tory policies can consequently be measured more along antitrust lines.
The principal arguments in favor of free entry of newspapers and
other communications media are: first, that since broadcasting to
some extent replaces the older media it is only fair to allow firms to
continue by permitting them to shift their investment from the older
to the newer media; and second, that there are economies of joint
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ownership of newspapers and radio stations which should be given
effect. The first is an equitable argument which has had considerable
influence on FCC policies, particularly with respect to entry of AM
stations into FM and TV. The second is a large issue on which there
is little available evidence. The most complete recent study, however,
concludes that such economies either do not exist or are of slight
magnitude.' 2 FCC financial data comparing the reports of broadcast
stations affiliated with newspapers and those not so affiliated supports
the same negative conclusion.
I assume, then, that there would be no loss of operating economies
if newspapers and other communications media were prohibited from
owning broadcast stations. And with the present scarcity of facilities
in the major cities, and high returns of existing stations, we may feel
confident that the flow of investment funds into broadcasting would
not be adversely affected by such a policy.
It will be recalled that the FCC's diversification policy is applied
primarily to newspaper applicants, and only in the relatively unim-
portant context of the comparative hearing. Cross-channel affiliations,
such as AM ownership of FM and TV stations, are not affected even
when the stations are located in the same area. My conclusion is that
the FCC has misdirected its energies and failed to prevent a degree of
concentration which, although it may not be excessive, seems unwise
when the Commission is engaged in rationing the limited supply of
broadcasting facilities which has been artificially created by the Com-
mission's allocation policies. Nearly 15% of all radio stations and
nearly 35% of all TV stations are affiliated with newspapers; and a
much larger proportion are affiliated with group owners, i.e., firms
owning two or more stations. Even more significant is the high
degree of concentration which prevails in a great many communities:
in 1958 the only local daily or weekly newspaper controlled the only
radio station in 118 communities; and there were a substantial number
of other communities, generally larger in size, in which the only news-
paper, or one of two newspapers, owned two or three of the available
broadcasting stations (AM, FM and TV).'3
FCC regulatory policies may help in protecting advertisers in
these communities from the more objectionable forms of combination
rates and other restrictive practices. But to the extent that monopoly
power over advertisers interested in reaching a particular market has
been created, it would be unrealistic to expect that monopoly rates are
not charged.
12 H. Levin, BROADCAST REGULATION AND INTER-MEDIUM COMPETITION
(1960) c. 3. JOINT OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA (1960) c. 4.
13 Id. at 80-81.
372 "
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C. Combined Ownership of Gas and Electric Utilities. The desir-
ability of the present regulatory indifference toward combined or
separate operation of electric and gas utilities in the same area would
appear to turn on a judgment concerning the desirable balance of two
factors: the existence or magnitude of economies of joint operation;
and the possibilities of inter-utility competition as an aid to public
regulation. The SEC required proof of "substantial" operating
economies before it would allow the continuation of gas and electric
utilities in the same integrated public utility system; and apparently
only a small number of situations met this test. Nor does it seem
likely that such economies would be very great: most of those which
have been suggested, such as savings on managerial and selling costs,
the use of one meter reader rather than two for a given home, etc.,
would not appear too great in magnitude or are related more to the
size of the utility than to the combination of two services. Combined
and separate companies exist side by side in a large number of states,
tending to indicate that economies of joint operation are not very
great.
On the other hand, the benefits of inter-utility competition would
appear to be limited by the monopoly position which each firm has.
The almost universal practice in the United States is to prevent local
utilities of the same type from competing with one another. Even
though gas and electricity may still be competitive for many purposes,
they are not for others; and in any event, the two firms in an area
can be expected to cooperate for their mutual benefit. Nevertheless,
it is arguable that the existence of some inter-utility competition will
hasten innovation, encourage each utility to cater to the service it can
perform more efficiently, and ease the burden of the regulatory com-
mission. Specific economic regulation is a difficult task at best; it
performs most creditably when competitive forces provide it with
some assistance.
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CONCLUSION
Of the three instances examined, the only effective limitation on
the diversification of a regulated firm is found in the one case of rail
entry into motor transportation. Although this limitation rests on
historical practices which have little present-day application, it is prob-
able that it does little harm. On the other hand, a greater concern
about concentration in broadcasting, and not merely with newspaper
ownership as a result of a comparative hearing, would be desirable.
The antitrust laws can be vigorously applied where violations have
occurred; and some supplemental use of regulatory powers is justi-
fied by the artificial restrictions on entry which result from FCC
allocation of the spectrum. Finally, separate ownership of gas and
electric utilities may have some beneficial effects if I am right in stat-
ing that substantial economies of joint operation are unlikely.
It should be apparent that these tentative conclusions are based
on incomplete data as well as certain assumptions regarding the desir-
able objectives of particular regulatory schemes. Whatever the merits
of the judgments I have reached, the method used has broad applica-
tion: assessing the benefits and costs of the regulatory policy in the
light of a sophisticated analysis of the objectives of the regulatory
scheme.
The regulatory commissions bear the primary responsibility of
developing sound policy on questions of common ownership, and a
word in closing is appropriate concerning their unwillingness or
inability to test prevailing slogans with methods of rational inquiry.
At every point in this paper we have been faced with the bare asser-
tion of competing slogans, cliches and unsupported factual assump-
tions. Yet most of the propositions asserted are capable of rational
analysis and empirical observation. The commissions have large
staffs; they have a continuing familiarity with the industries they
regulate; their files are enormous repositories of the relevant informa-
tion. Why, one wonders, do they not use some intelligence and some
of this available information to test the propositions which are so
freely asserted.
The ICC, for example, has refused to take any position on the
numerous legislative proposals which would put the railroads on the
same footing as other applicants for motor carrier rights. One can
sympathize with the Commission's reluctance to offend any of its
client groups by expressing a policy judgment on this heated issue.
Yet the Commission, at the least, has a responsibility to develop the
factual and analytical materials which would enable Congress to pass
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intelligently on the question. What are the economies of "integrated"
transportation service? Is it likely that the railroads, if allowed to
enter motor carrier operations, would operate their motor carrier
affiliates in a manner harmful to the public interest? Have they done
so in any of the numerous instances in which railroads have been
given motor carrier operating rights? What are the economic effects
of the restrictions presently placed on railroad motor carrier opera-
tion ?
These and many other questions, relating to each of the instances
I have discussed, are susceptible to observation and verification, at
least in part. The regulatory commissions have not fulfilled the prom-
ise that called them into being if they continue to shirk the respon-
sibility for formulating public policy which the legislatures have laid
upon them.
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1:30 p. m. to 3:30 p. m.




5. The Regulation of Motor Carriers
George E. Hale
Chicago, Illinois
6. Antitrust Enforcement by the Atomic Energy Commission
Bennett Boskey
Washington, D. C.
7. Exemptions for Cooperatives
John Noakes, Esq.
New York, New York
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